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Abstract
The importance of training robust neural network
grows as 3D data is increasingly utilized in deep learn-
ing for vision tasks, like autonomous driving. We
examine this problem from the perspective of the
attacker, which is necessary in understanding how
neural networks can be exploited, and thus defended.
More specifically, we propose adversarial attacks based
on solving different optimization problems, like mini-
mizing the perceptibility of our generated adversarial
examples, or maintaining a uniform density distribu-
tion of points across the adversarial object surfaces.
Our four proposed algorithms for attacking 3D point
cloud classification are all highly successful on exist-
ing neural networks, and we find that some of them
are even effective against previously proposed point
removal defenses.
1 Introduction
Improving the resilience of neural networks against
adversarial attacks is an important step in building
more robust and secure models. Currently, both new
attacks and new defensive techniques are being devel-
oped. Attacks are important for finding out how we
can exploit the neural networks, and that allows us to
craft better defenses. It also allows us to study the be-
havior of neural networks against out-of-distribution
adversarial examples. Though adversarial attacks
and defenses are well-studied for 2D images, they are
only beginning to be examined in 3D space and other
domains by making use of domain-specific insights.
3D data is important because it is used as an in-
put for controlling autonomous driving systems and
robotics. However, one hindrance in studying deep
learning on 3D data is due to the different representa-
tion of 3D data, like voxels, point clouds, and meshes.
We specifically look into the task of 3D point cloud
classification, which involves feeding order-invariant
point sets into neural networks. 3D point cloud data
can be obtained in many ways. For examine, point
clouds are produced in LiDAR (Light Detection and
Ranging) scans, RGB-D scans, and photogrammetry
of 3D objects. Point clouds can also be obtained
through conversions from other data types, like 3D
meshes or voxels.
Figure 1: The adversarial attack and defense process
with our four proposed attacks.
It is easy to create effective adversarial attacks.
However, we are interested in crafting adversarial per-
turbations that satisfy certain criteria. For example,
Lp norms are commonly used to bound the percep-
tibility, or the degree of change, in perturbations on
2D images. This allows the adversarial perturbations
to be human-imperceptible if the change is small. In
this paper, we want to exploit certain criteria that are
only valid for 3D point clouds that describe the shape
or surface of 3D objects in generating our adversarial
examples. Therefore, we develop four new algorithms
for attacking 3D deep learning:
• A distributional attack using projected gradient
descent that attempts to maintain the shape of a
3D object that is represented as a point cloud.
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• Two resampling-based attacks that attempt to
modify the shape of a 3D object through vanilla
gradient descent and resampling.
• A differentiable operation that changes the shape
of a 3D point cloud by attracting points on the
surface of the represented object, which can be
directly optimized with efficient first order meth-
ods.
These algorithms are based on novel formulations of
the optimization problems for generating adversarial
examples, and we approximate solutions to them with
different techniques. Naturally, our approaches differ
from previous attacks created for 2D images because
we take into consideration the intrinsic shape structure
of the 3D points. A cartoon describing our algorithms
is shown in Figure 2, and it provides a brief overview
of the main steps in our algorithms.
We perform experiments on the PointNet [Qi et al.,
2017b] and PointNet++ [Qi et al., 2017c] models with
the ModelNet40 [Wu et al., 2015] dataset. We use
point clouds that are sampled from the surface of the
3D objects with uniform density.1
2 Related Work
2.1 Attacks
Szegedy et al. [2013] first examined how adversarial
perturbations on 2D images could be generated on
a neural network by searching for some perturbation
that causes a neural network to make a wrong pre-
diction. Goodfellow et al. [2014] later proposed a
fast approximation for generating adversarial exam-
ples using one step gradient descent constrained by
the L∞ norm. This result was generalized by Madry
et al. [2017] and Kurakin et al. [2016b,a] to obtain
an attack that maximized the overall loss resulting
from the perturbations, while bounding the magni-
tude of the perturbations by the Lp norm, for some p.
This optimization problem is solved through multiple
iterations of projected gradient descent, in what is
sometimes known as the “iterative gradient attack”.
There are many further improvements by Papernot
et al. [2016a], Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [2016], Dong
et al. [2018], and Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [2017] on
perturbing 2D images. Carlini and Wagner [2017]
proposed a different approach that minimizes both
an objective function that represents the distance be-
tween the current prediction and the target class, and
1The source code for this work is available at
this http url: https://github.com/Daniel-Liu-c0deb0t/
Adversarial-point-perturbations-on-3D-objects.
the perturbation’s Lp norm at the same time. Then,
the neural network misclassifies into a specific target
class.
In terms of understanding adversarial examples,
Ilyas et al. [2019] discovered that adversarial examples
are due to neural networks learning and relying on
human-imperceptible features.
Only very recently has adversarial attacks been
examined in 3D space. For 3D point clouds, Xiang
et al. [2018], Yang et al. [2019], and Liu et al. [2019] all
proposed point perturbations based on shifting points
using ideas similar to attacks on 2D images. Xiang
et al. [2018] also proposed an attack that generates
clusters of points with different shapes. For this attack,
they optimize an objective function that constrains the
distance between the generated clusters and the main
benign point cloud. Zheng et al. [2018] and Wicker
and Kwiatkowska [2019] both proposed saliency-based
techniques for removing points. An adversarial attack
that perturbed the distribution of points on a 3D
object’s surface was examined in Liu et al. [2019].
Adversarial attacks on LiDAR systems were proposed
in Cao et al. [2019] by making the scanning operation
that converts a triangular mesh into a point cloud
differentiable.
2.2 Defenses
A popular defense for 2D image space is adversarial
training, where a neural network is trained with adver-
sarial examples [Goodfellow et al., 2014]. This is done
by adding the loss incurred by adversarial examples
to the objective function that is optimized throughout
training. Another defensive technique is defensive
distillation [Papernot et al., 2016b]. Later work has
shown that a neural network can be trained to be
provably robust [Wong and Kolter, 2017]. For neu-
ral networks that classify 3D point clouds, removing
points was shown to be more effective than adver-
sarial training. In particular, Liu et al. [2019] and
Zhou et al. [2018] both examined removing outlier
points, and Liu et al. [2019] also examined removing
salient points. Liu et al. [2019] argued that these
defenses were effective due to the special global max
pooling operation in the PointNet [Qi et al., 2017b]
and PointNet++ [Qi et al., 2017c] architectures that
were evaluated, which provides some sort of gradient
masking to hide some points against gradient-based
perturbations.
2.3 3D Deep Learning
3D deep learning has recently experienced exponential
growth. Many network architectures were proposed
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Figure 2: 2D cartoon describing the general idea for our four adversarial attacks. Note that in 3D, we
estimate shapes through flat 3D triangles instead of line segments.
for different tasks in 3D deep learning.
We specifically examine the case of 3D point cloud
classification. PointNet [Qi et al., 2017b] and Point-
Net++ [Qi et al., 2017c] are two architectures built
specifically for learning from point sets. Other work
on this task include Qi et al. [2017a] and Deng et al.
[2018].
There is also work on handling voxel (quantized
point cloud) data [Wang et al., 2017, Wu et al., 2015].
3 Setting
We have a neural network model fθ : RN×3 7→ RM ,
which solves the 3D point cloud classification task by
predicting probability vectors for each output class.
It takes in x, a set of N 3D points, and outputs a
vector fθ(x) of length M that contains the probability
of the input x being each output possible class. The
model fθ is trained by adjusting its parameters θ to
minimize the cross entropy loss, which is denoted by
J(fθ(x), y), for each sample x and its corresponding
one-hot label y that are drawn from the distribution
D:
minimize
θ
E(x,y)∼DJ(fθ(x), y) (1)
In terms of notation, we will use vector and set
operations on a point cloud interchangeably (for ex-
ample, norm and set union operations), since a point
cloud is a set of unique points, but we can also assign
an arbitrary order to the points so it behaves like
a vector. For a point set x, we can access its i-th
element (point) through x[i].
In terms of the threat model, we assume that the
attacker has full access to the architecture and pa-
rameters θ of a neural network fθ (white-box threat
model). The attacker also has access to the unstruc-
tured 3D point clouds, which they can change before
feeding them to the neural network. Therefore, we
wish to construct attacks that are purely based on un-
structured 3D point sets, without any extra shape or
normal information on the structure of the point set.
We will focus on generating untargeted attacks, where
the attacker is attempting to force a neural network
into misclassifying an object of a certain class into a
different class.
In our experiments, we also evaluate defensive tech-
niques. After we generate adversarial attacks on a
clean/benign point cloud x by perturbing it with
δ ∈ RN×3 to obtain x∗ = x + δ, we feed x∗ to a de-
fense before it is classified by a neural network. The
full attack and defense pipeline is shown in Figure 1.
We now discuss the outlier removal and salient point
removal defenses from Liu et al. [2019] in more detail
because they are used in our experiments. The outlier
removal defense involves first calculating statistical
outliers through
o[i] =
1
K
K∑
j=1
NN(x∗[i], j), ∀i ∈ {1 . . . N} (2)
with NN(ρ, j) returning the j-th nearest neighboring
point of the point ρ. Then, we remove points greater
than  standard deviations away from the average o[i]
3
Figure 3: Visualizations of adversarial examples that are generated on the PointNet architecture, for five
different ModelNet40 classes.
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across all i:
x∗∗ = x∗ \
{
x∗[i] : o[i] >
1
N
N∑
j=1
o[j] + STDEV(o)
∧ i ∈ {1 . . . N}
}
(3)
In the salient point removal defense, salient points are
identified and removed by first calculating the saliency
s[i] = max
j∈{1...M}
∣∣∣∣∣∣(∇x∗fθ(x∗)[j])[i]∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
, ∀i ∈ {1 . . . N}
(4)
and a subset of the points in x∗ with the highest
saliencies are removed.
4 Attack Types
In this paper, we examine two classes of attacks. The
first type of attacks is constructed to perturb the
distribution of points on or very near a 3D object.
This allows the shape of an object to remain mostly
unchanged, so the perturbations remain unnoticeable
to humans. The second type of attacks we examine is
focused on changing the shape of an object given only
its point cloud, and we do not force the perceptibility
of this attack to be extremely low.
These shape attacks have two main benefits. First,
it is easier to construct an adversarial example with
the shape attacks in real-life, because it is difficult to
change the distribution of points obtained through
a scanner, while changing the shape is considerably
easier. Also, changing the shape is more realistic than
creating outlier points that float far away from a 3D
object in point-based attacks [Xiang et al., 2018, Liu
et al., 2019]. Second, it is robust against point cloud
restoration defenses that attempt to recover informa-
tion about the shape of an adversarial point cloud
based on the density of points. This is because the
shape attacks are built to maintain uniform densities
of points in the adversarial examples, so that they
behave as if points were directly sampled from of a
perturbed 3D object. Thus, any density information
is essentially destroyed, so it is difficult to apply a de-
fensive method that utilizes this special 3D property.
Also, defending against attacks by removing points
will not work, since removing a few points will not
change the overall shape of a perturbed 3D object.
5 Distributional Attack
To craft a distributional attack, we need to first quan-
tify the perceptibility of the adversarial perturba-
tions. Although the perceptibility of different adver-
sarial perturbations is quite subjective to humans, we
choose to quantify perceptibility by comparing a per-
turbed, adversarial point cloud to the true shape of
the clean/benign surface point cloud, which is repre-
sented by a set of infinite points S. By comparing the
adversarial point cloud to the true shape of the object,
we can measure how far the perturbations cause the
adversarial point cloud to deviate from the true shape
it should be describing. This also allows us to ignore
small changes to the density of points on the surface
of the object, which do not disturb the overall shape
of the object, and are thus deemed imperceptible.
More specifically, we use the Hausdorff distance
between two sets A and B to quantify perceptibility:
H(A,B) = max
a∈A
min
b∈B
||b− a||2 (5)
In other words, we want to find the maximum of the
distances between each point in A and its closest point
in B, where the Euclidean distance metric is used.
Note that the true surface S is usually approxi-
mated through a triangular mesh t ∈ RT×3×3, with T
triangles total. However, throughout this paper, we
will often express ideas using the set S instead of its
triangular mesh approximation, since a set is easier
to manipulate. In practice, since triangular meshes
are used instead of S, we define a distance metric D
that describes the distance between a set of points x,
and a set of triangles t:
D(x, t) = max
i∈{1...N}
min
j∈{1...T}
d(x[i], t[j]) (6)
The distance d(a, b) between a single point a and a
single triangle b is defined as the distance between the
point a and the closest point to a on the triangle b.
Our approach differs from that of Xiang et al. [2018],
because we measure the amount of perturbation by
comparing the perturbed point cloud x∗ to S (or its
approximation t), rather than the benign point cloud
x. The benefit of our approach is that it is less sensi-
tive to the density of points in x. Our method also
differs from using an Lp norm to measure perceptibil-
ity, as Lp norms do not take the shape of a 3D object
into account.
If we structure our optimization problem for con-
structing adversarial point clouds to minimize H, then
we can craft adversarial perturbations that are imper-
ceptible. A naive formulation of the problem yields
minimize
δ
H(x+ δ, S)
subject to arg max fθ(x+ δ) 6= arg max y
(7)
However, this formulation is very hard to solve with
gradient-based methods since the objective function
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Algorithm 1 The distributional attack algorithm.
Input: x: input benign point cloud with N points, n: number of iterations, τ : maximum distance from S, and :
amount of perturbation.
Output: x∗: adversarial point cloud.
tri ← Boundary triangles of the alpha shape of x
tree ← Build a VP-tree on the triangles in tri
x∗ ← x
for i ∈ {1 . . . n} do
δ ← 
n
( ∇x∗J(fθ(x∗),y)
||∇x∗J(fθ(x∗),y)||2
)
x∗ ← x∗ + δ
x∗ ← Project each point in x∗ to be within τ distance away from the triangles in tri, using the VP-tree tree
end for
and the constraint are not differentiable. Therefore,
we reformulate this problem to maximize a smooth
(differentiable) loss function:
maximize
δ
J(fθ(x+ δ), y)
subject to H(x+ δ, S) ≤ τ
(8)
This formulation is similar to the optimization prob-
lem solved through Madry et al. [2017]’s projected
gradient descent, but with a different method for mea-
suring perceptibility.
Now, we consider the special case where τ = 0, and
show that this leads to the previously proposed “gra-
dient projection” attack. The effect of setting τ = 0 is
that the perturbations must not cause any points to
move off the shape of the point cloud. If we attempt
to simplify this further and constrain each point in
x to be within the triangle in t that contains that
point after perturbing x, then we obtain the previ-
ous gradient projection technique [Liu et al., 2019].
However, our goal is to solve this problem without
simplifications, and without relying on the surface
triangles that is assumed to be given in the input.
Note that the constraint is still not differentiable, so
we cannot directly apply gradient descent.
To solve this problem, we take inspiration from pro-
jected gradient descent [Madry et al., 2017], which is
used in attacks on 2D images (e.g., using max{min{x+
δ, 1}, 0} to clip the perturbed pixels onto the proper
range for each color channel), and attempt to project
x+ δ onto the set S at each step in the attack. Before
projecting the perturbed points, we still need to cal-
culate δ to perturb the points in arbitrary directions.
Therefore, we can constrain the Lp norm (we use the
L2 norm) of the perturbations before projecting the
perturbed points, in order to control the scale the
perturbations through the hyperparameter . Thus,
the optimization problem can be solved by iterating
x∗1 = x,
x∗i+1 =
N⋃
j=1
{
P
(
x∗i [j] +

n
(
(∇x∗i J(fθ(x∗i ), y))[j]
||∇x∗i J(fθ(x∗i ), y)||2
)
, S
)}
,
∀i ∈ {1 . . . n− 1}
(9)
for a projection function P , which projects a perturbed
point into the region around S. We can express this
projection function as
P(ρ, S) = arg min
s∈{a:H({a},S)≤τ∧a∈R3}
||ρ− s||2 (10)
Conceptually, we are convolving a sphere of radius
τ with the surface S to obtain the set of all points
within τ distance of S, through what is known as
Minkowski addition.
There are a few problems with directly applying
the aforementioned attack in practice:
1. We lack the true bounding shape of each input
object, which is represented as t. We need some
method to infer the triangles on the surface of a
point cloud x. This inferred shape does not need
to be extremely accurate—an approximation will
suffice as long as the projected perturbations are
not noticeable.
2. There is significant overhead from naively ex-
amining each triangle in t to find the nearest
possible projection point. The entire operation
has a time complexity of O(NT ) with respect to
each constant-time projection operation, which
hinders the scalability of the attack as the num-
ber of point clouds and the number of points
increases.
The first problem can be solved by constructing a
triangulation of the surface of an input object through
its 3D point cloud. We choose to construct the alpha
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shape [Edelsbrunner et al., 1983] of the point cloud
and obtain the boundary triangles, though there are
other triangulation methods like the ball-pivoting al-
gorithm [Bernardini et al., 1999]. The alpha shape
algorithm involves first computing a 3D Delaunay
triangulation [Lee and Schachter, 1980] of the point
cloud to obtain a set of tetrahedrons, and then re-
moving tetrahedrons with circumscribing spheres of
radius greater than the constant parameter α. In
our experiments, we use the average distance between
each point and its adjacent points in the Delaunay
triangulation as the α value.
To speed up projection queries, we can build some
sort of data structure to store the triangles that we are
projecting onto. Let us bound the triangle t[i] with
a circle of radius r[i] and center c[i], ∀i ∈ {1 . . . T}.
Then, we can represent each triangle with its cor-
responding center point c[i], for some i. We build
a VP-tree [Yianilos, 1993], which recursively parti-
tions a metric space with circles, on the points c.
When we project a point ρ that is perturbed by a vec-
tor δ, we only project ρ + δ onto triangles whose
centers lie in a sphere centered at ρ with radius
R = ||δ||2 + τ + maxi∈{1...T} r[i]. This is because
we assume that the point ρ lies within a triangle be-
fore it is perturbed, and so that triangle must lie in
the sphere with radius R and centered at ρ+ δ. We
do not need to examine any triangles farther away if
we are guaranteed to encounter at least one triangle
within the radius R.
The full algorithm for the distributional attack is
summarized in Algorithm 1. Note that the triangu-
lation and VP-tree algorithms will be used later for
other attacks.
6 Shape Attacks
We want to perturb the shape of an object to gen-
erate effective attacks, which is the opposite of the
distributional attack. These shape attacks have the
benefit of being more realistic and also more robust
against 3D point cloud specific defenses, instead of
being imperceptible. However, constructing these at-
tacks is nontrivial because we only have access to a
set of points x that is sampled from the true shape
of the object. The general idea behind each of our
proposed shape attacks is that we ensure that points
are evenly sampled on the resulting shape implicitly
represented by the point cloud x. We define an even
sampling that results in the points x ⊂ S on a sur-
face represented by S as ensuring that the distances
between each point and its nearest neighboring point
in x is the maximum possible so clusters of points do
not form. In other words, we want the density of the
sampled points to be as uniform as possible on S.
We present three attacks that form three different
perspectives on how we can maintain the uniform
density of points. The first algorithm, perturbation
resampling, is a straightforward realization of the idea
of enforcing an even sampling after perturbing the
shape of a point cloud. Then, we propose a method
to add additional adversarial structures (sticks) to
a 3D object. These two methods rely on inferring
the overall shape of a point cloud and resampling,
which are both nondifferentiable. Finally, we propose
fully differentiable attack for perturbing the shape
represented by a point cloud without first attempting
to estimate the overall shape of the point cloud.
6.1 Perturbation Resampling
Consider an adversarial object’s surface that is rep-
resented by the set S∗, and its benign surface which
is represented S. We want to ensure that the point
distribution of a point cloud x∗ ⊂ S∗ is even on this
surface. This idea can be expressed through the fol-
lowing optimization problem:
maximize
x∗,S∗
J(fθ(x
∗), y)
+ λ min
i∈{1...N}
min
j∈{1...N}\{i}
||x∗[j]− x∗[i]||2
subject to H(S∗, S) ≤ ,
x∗[k] ∈ S∗, ∀k ∈ {1 . . . N}
(11)
In other words, we want to change the shape S∗ to
maximize the loss J(fθ(x
∗), y), but we also want to
maximize the distance between each point in x∗ and its
nearest point as much as possible. However, it is hard
to directly optimize using gradient-based methods
to solve this problem due to the highly nonlinear
objective function. Therefore, we seek to construct an
acceptable approximation of the solution x∗ through
farthest point sampling.
We use farthest point sampling on a large subset
of randomly sampled points from S∗ to obtain a set
of points with approximately uniform density on S∗.
Farthest point sampling allows us to pick a new point
that is the farthest away from previously picked points
in each iteration of the algorithm, which leads to a
greedy approximation to maximizing the minimum
distances between each point and its nearest neighbor-
ing point. In practice, the points are sampled from
an approximation of S∗ that is obtained through the
alpha shape algorithm.
During each iteration of the perturbation resamping
attack, we first execute one step of gradient descent
constrained by the L2 norm and perturb the point
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Algorithm 2 The perturbation resampling algorithm.
Input: x: input benign point cloud with N points, n: number of iterations, : amount of perturbation, and κ:
number of points to resample.
Output: x∗: adversarial point cloud.
x∗ ← x
for i ∈ {1 . . . n} do
δ ← 
n
( ∇x∗J(fθ(x∗),y)
||∇x∗J(fθ(x∗),y)||2
)
x∗ ← x∗ + δ
tri ← Boundary triangles of the alpha shape of x∗
R(v) =
∣∣∣{j : ||δ[j]||2 ≤ v ∧ j ∈ {1 . . . N}}∣∣∣ . Statistical rank of v.
sampled ← Farthest point sampling on tri for κ points, starting with the points in{
x∗[j] : κ+ 1 ≤ R(||δ[j]||2) ≤ N ∧ j ∈ {1 . . . N}
}
x∗ ← {x∗[j] : κ+ 1 ≤ R(||δ[j]||2) ≤ N ∧ j ∈ {1 . . . N}} ∪ sampled
end for
cloud. Then, we approximate the shape of this per-
turbed point cloud by computing the alpha shape.
Finally, we use farthest point sampling to resample
the κ points with the lowest saliencies, which is defined
as the L2 norm of the gradient of the loss function wrt
each point. The N − κ points with higher saliencies
are automatically considered “picked” from sampling.
The full algorithm is sketched in Algorithm 2. We
are essentially perturbing the underlying shape of the
3D point cloud, while ensuring that points are evenly
sampled on the surface of that shape when the surface
is stretched due to the perturbations.
One drawback of this attack is that the total per-
turbation x∗ − x is not directly bounded by  under
the original L2 norm used in gradient descent. This is
due to the resampling operation that may arbitrarily
shift each of the κ points. In practice, this attack
does not generate large, perceptible changes since the
resampling operation only shifts points on the surface
of the perturbed object. Another drawback is that
intuitively, optimizing using gradient descent to in-
crease J(fθ(x
∗), y) is hard, since resampling points
arbitrarily shifts the position of the point cloud on
the loss wrt input surface in each iteration. Further-
more, momentum and acceleration cannot be used in
gradient descent due to the arbitrary jumps in our
position while optimizing. However, in practice, we
find that the success rate of this attack is high with
just a few iterations of basic gradient descent.
6.2 Adversarial Sticks
We can attempt to create new features on the mesh
instead of making small, incremental deformities
through the perturbation resampling attack. Xiang
et al. [2018] explores this idea by adding clusters of
points and even 3D objects from other classes to at-
tack a benign 3D object. However, their attack does
not enforce any connection between the benign object
and the added clusters of points. In other words, the
crafted adversarial example can contain many disjoint
point clouds. We think that this is unrealistic for a
classification task on a single point cloud object, so we
attempt to add a new feature (sticks, or line segments)
onto a point cloud, where the sticks must originate
from the surface of the benign 3D object.
A straightforward formulation of the problem re-
sults in optimizing the position vector α ∈ Rσ×3, ori-
entation and length vector β ∈ Rσ×3, for generating
σ sticks:
maximize
α,β
J(fθ(x ∪ Sκ(α, α+ β)), y)
subject to ||β||2 ≤ ,
α[k] ∈ S, ∀k ∈ {1 . . . σ}
(12)
Note that Sκ(α, α + β) samples κ points across the
line segments defined by the points α[i] and α[i]+β[i],
∀i ∈ {1 . . . σ}. The sampling procedure involves as-
signing points to each stick with probability propor-
tional to its length, and then all points assigned to
a stick are evenly spread out along the stick. These
sampled points are added to the point cloud x, and
they represent sticks that are connected to the point
cloud. However, solving this is difficult due to a num-
ber of factors. First, the sampling function S is not
differentiable, which means that the objective func-
tion cannot be directly maximized. Second, we need
to somehow constrain the position of each stick onto
the surface of the benign point cloud x in each step
of the attack.
We want to eliminate these two problems. The first
problem can be solved by approximating the solu-
tion to the optimization problem by perturbing points
based on saliency (L2 norm of gradients) instead of
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Algorithm 3 The adversarial sticks algorithm.
Input: x: input benign point cloud with N points, n: number of iterations, σ: number of sticks, : amount of
perturbation, and κ: number of points to resample onto the sticks.
Output: x∗: adversarial point cloud.
x∗ ← x
for i ∈ {1 . . . n} do
δ ← 
n
( ∇x∗J(fθ(x∗),y)
||∇x∗J(fθ(x∗),y)||2
)
x∗ ← x∗ + δ
R(v) =
∣∣∣{j : ||δ[j]||2 ≤ v ∧ j ∈ {1 . . . N}}∣∣∣ . Statistical rank of v.
∆← {x∗[j] : N − σ + 1 ≤ R(||δ[j]||2) ≤ N ∧ j ∈ {1 . . . N}}
x∗ ← {x[j] : κ+ 1 ≤ R(||δ[j]||2) ≤ N ∧ j ∈ {1 . . . N}} ∪ Sκ(⋃σk=1 {P(∆[k])},∆)
end for
orienting sticks. The assumption here is that perturb-
ing a few points and then connecting those points
to their closest points on the surface of the benign
point cloud is an effective alternative to controlling
the direction of sticks on the surface of the point cloud.
To solve the second problem, we sample points on the
generated sticks at the end, after directly perturbing
points based on the gradient of fθ. Also, instead of
adding new points to the point cloud, we directly
resample points with low saliencies to the sticks. In
summary, we use gradient descent constrained with
the L2 norm to attack the point cloud x, pick the
σ points with the largest perturbations (saliencies),
and sample points on the line segments defined by
each perturbed point and its closest point (projection)
on the surface of the benign point cloud. The full
algorithm is given in Algorithm 3.
There are two main problems with this attack, sim-
ilar to the perturbation resampling attack. First, the
perturbations are no longer constrained by some  un-
der the L2 norm after resampling some points, though
we can still control the magnitude of the perturbation
by tweaking the  value for the gradient descent at-
tack before sampling. Second, the sampling operation
causes our location on the loss wrt input surface to
jump arbitrarily during optimization, like the pertur-
bation resampling attack. It is possible for the loss
J(fθ(x
∗), y) to decrease after sampling points on the
adversarial sticks, while we want the loss to stay the
same or increase. This loss decrease is rare or insignif-
icant in practice, since we find that the success rate
of this attack is high in our experiments.
6.3 Resampling During Gradient De-
scent
The effectiveness of the perturbation resampling and
adversarial sticks attack is still unexplained because of
the sampling operations that are interleaved with basic
gradient descent steps. Therefore, we wish to build
some intuition on why resampling points as described
in the two previous attacks should not significantly
decrease the higher loss attained through the basic
gradient descent attack, if we assume that the neural
networks are highly linear.
Consider the general architecture of the Point-
Net [Qi et al., 2017b] and PointNet++ [Qi et al.,
2017c] networks, which is expressed as
fθ(x) = hθ2
(
MAX
i∈{1...N}
gθ1(x[i])
)
(13)
with gθ1 representing a learnable nonlinear trans-
formation on each point in x, and hθ2 outputting
a probability vector for each output class. In this
case global MAX operation is performed element-
wise (i.e., maximum along each dimension) and pro-
duces a feature vector. Our analysis will focus on the
global max pooling operation. We define a point x[i]
as being selected by the max pooling operation iff
∃j : gθ1(x[i])[j] = MAXk∈{1...N} gθ1(x[k])[j].
For example, consider the simplified case where only
one point is perturbed away from the initial benign
point cloud, and that leads to an adversarial example
which causes a neural network to mispredict. The
perturbed point must be selected by the max pooling
operation, since otherwise it cannot increase the loss,
which is necessary in misprediction. In order for this
perturbation to be effective, the neural network must
also ignore (not select with the max pooling opera-
tion) existing, unperturbed points near the perturbed
point, and the network is forced to pay attention to
the perturbed point instead of other points in its lo-
cal spatial region. This observation hints that the
resampling operations in perturbation resampling and
adversarial sticks mostly results in redundant points
that are purely for visual purposes (e.g., points are
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evenly distributed on the surface of the point cloud).
This is important because it shows that we are not
jumping around by arbitrary amounts on the loss wrt
input surface due to resampling while using gradient
descent to craft the attacks.
Let us examine a simple case where the function
gθ1 is defined as
gθ1(x[i]) = ψ(Wx[i] +B), ∀i ∈ {1 . . . N} (14)
In other words, we apply a nonlinearity (ReLU, or
ψ(z) = max(0, z)) to each point x[i] after it under-
goes an affine transformation. Note that in practice,
there will be multiple layers of transformations. Now,
if we assume that Wx[i] + B > 0, ∀i ∈ {1 . . . N},
then we just have the affine transformation. Goodfel-
low et al. [2014] argued that neural networks avoid
the nonsaturating (flat) part of the ReLU function
throughout training, which causes neural networks to
behave linearly, so this is a reasonable assumption.
The important property of affine transformations that
we need is that it preserve lines and planes, and the
ratio of distances between points before and after an
affine transformation.
Consider a line segment made up of a set of colinear
points x, which starts at point u and ends at point v.
Note that if we compute MAXk∈{1...N} x[k], the only
points selected by the elementwise max operation will
be the endpoints u or v, if we will ignore the rare
cases where the line segment is exactly parallel to
an axis. In this case, we define a point x[i] as being
selected iff ∃j : x[i][j] = MAXk∈{1...N} x[k][j]. After
an affine transformation, the points are still colinear,
and the points u and v are maintained as endpoints
with all other points in between u and v on the line
segment due to the ratio of distances between points
being preserved. The points u and v are still the
only points that can be selected by the max operation
because they are the endpoints. We can directly
extend this idea to the general case with multiple
line segments in the adversarial sticks attack. If the
PointNet and PointNet++ networks are mostly kept
in the nonsaturating part of the ReLU function, then
there is a high probability that sampling new points
on the sticks (line segments) will not affect the points
that are chosen by the max pooling operation, and
thus they will not affect the network’s prediction.
For perturbation resampling, we sample points on
triangles that have points perturbed through gradient
descent as vertices. If we have a set of points x that
represents the vertices (a, b, and c) of the triangle
and a few other points sampled within the triangle,
then MAXk∈{1...N} x[k] will only select the vertices
a, b, or c of the triangle, except for a few rare cases
where the edges are parallel to an axis, similar to
the line segments. After an affine transformation on
x, the result will still represent a triangle with the
vertices a, b, and c at different locations, and all other
sampled points within that triangle, similar to the
line segments case. This is also due to the ratio of the
distances between points being preserved in an affine
transformation. Therefore, those vertex points will
still be the only points selected by the elementwise
max pooling operation after an affine transformation
(and ReLU). In general, even with multiple triangles,
points sampled within each triangle will very likely
not affect the output of the neural network if it is
highly linear.
The consequence of resampled points in a point
cloud being ignored by the max pooling operation is
that each resampling operation will move the location
of the point cloud on the loss wrt input surface, but it
will not change the loss. More specifically, consider the
level set {x∗ : J(fθ(x∗), y) = ` ∧ x∗ ∈ RN×3}, where
we have attained a loss of ` so far due to gradient
descent. Resampling points in x∗ is essentially moves
x∗ to another point in the level set, as the loss stays
the same because the resampled points do not affect
the output of the neural network.
We show an example of the adversarial sticks attack
in Figure 4. The sticks do have many points with
zero gradients, but there are also points with nonzero
gradients, which is due to PointNet’s nonlinearity.
Later, we will show that even though some resampled
points have nonzero gradients, resampling with gra-
dient descent is able to generate effective adversarial
attacks.
Figure 4: Example of the adversarial sticks attack on
PointNet, with the stool object. Points with gradient
equal to zero across all three dimensions are green.
Notice that there are many points with zero gradients
the adversarial sticks, but there are also a few points
with nonzero gradients.
Interestingly, we show that attacks are also able
to exploit the max pooling operation, as previously,
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the global max pooling operation was shown to be
helpful when removing points for defending against
adversarial attacks [Liu et al., 2019]. We note that
our assumptions about the high degree of linearity
of neural networks is not likely in practice, but it
gives theoretically guarantees about our algorithm in
a specific scenario that may extend to the general case
of nonlinear transforms that is harder to analyze.
6.4 Adversarial Sinks
We can deform the shape of the benign point cloud
to generate an adversarial example without inferring
its surface. We guide this deformation through sink
points, which pull points in the point cloud in a local
spatial region towards them. The reason for guiding
the deformation process with a few points is because
we want local changes to the shape of the point cloud
that moves points that are selected by the max pooling
operation. In other words, we want to minimize global
changes to points that are not selected by the max
pooling operation, as the max pooling operation is
able to ignore a significant subset of points [Qi et al.,
2017b].
Given a set of σ sink points sf ∈ Rσ×3 that are
initialized with s0 ∈ Rσ×3, we can deform the point
cloud x to create x∗ with
x∗[i] = x[i]
+ tanh
( σ∑
j=1
(sf [j]− x[i])φµ′(||s0[j]− x[i]||2)
)
,
∀i ∈ {1 . . . N}
(15)
where φµ′ represents a radial basis function that de-
creases the influence of each sink point by distance.
This means that points in the point cloud that are
far away from a sink point’s initial position will be
influenced less by that sink point as it moves. We use
the Gaussian radial basis function which is defined as
φµ′(r) = e
−
(
r
µ′
)2
(16)
for
µ′ =
µ
N
N∑
i=1
min
j∈{1...N}\{i}
∣∣∣∣x[j]− x[i]∣∣∣∣
2
(17)
The hyperparameter µ can be tuned to control how
the influence of each sink point falls off as distance
increases. The influence of each sink point is also
scaled by the average distance between point in x and
its nearest neighboring point, so it is invariant to the
scale of the point cloud x. We choose the Gaussian
radial basis function because it is differentiable every-
where and it outputs a value between 0 and 1, which
represents a percentage of the distance between each
point cloud point and sink point. In essence, Equa-
tion 15 represents shifting each point in the point
cloud by the weighted sum of the vectors from that
point to each sink point.
We can move the positions of the sink points to
increase the overall loss. Essentially, we want to solve
the following optimization problem:
maximize
sf
J
(
fθ(x
∗), y
)− λ||x∗ − x||2 (18)
where x∗ is constructed according to Equation 15.
The idea is that we are trying to maximize the overall
loss by shifting our sink points sf , while minimizing
the L2 norm of the perturbation. The hyperparam-
eter λ can be adjusted to balance the emphasis on
maximizing the loss and minimizing the L2 norm of
the perturbation. Unlike previous attacks that involve
resampling, the perturbation operation on x with the
sinks points sf is fully differentiable wrt sf :
∂J(fθ(x
∗), y)
∂sf
=
σ⋃
i=1
{ N∑
j=1
(∇x∗J(fθ(x∗), y))[j]
 tanh′
( σ∑
k=1
(sf [k]− x[j])φµ′(||s0[k]− x[j]||2)
)
· φµ′(||s0[i]− x[j]||2)
}
(19)
Therefore, we can directly apply a gradient-based opti-
mization algorithm like Adam [Kingma and Ba, 2014]
to maximize our objective function. In Equation 19,
we see that the gradient wrt a sink point is scaled
using the function φµ′ , so points farther away from
that sink point contribute less to how that sink point
is moved during optimization.
It is important to tune λ to ensure that the mag-
nitude of the perturbation stays plausible. To this
end, we also apply tanh element-wise to the pertur-
bation vector of each point in order to bound the
perturbation with the horizontal asymptotes of the
tanh function.
Now, the question of how we initialize sf and s0
remains. We can examine the saliency of each point
in x, which is given by the L2 norm of the gradient
of the loss of a neural network with respect to that
point. Then, we can choose σ points with the highest
saliencies and use their locations as the initial values
for sf and s0.
The full algorithm in shown in Algorithm 4.
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Algorithm 4 The adversarial sinks algorithm.
Input: x: input benign point cloud with N points, n: number of iterations, σ: number of sinks, η: learning rate,
λ: coefficient of the perceptibility term, and µ: coefficient of the falloff of the influence of each sink point.
Output: x∗: adversarial point cloud.
µ′ ← µ
N
∑N
i=1 minj∈{1...N}\{i}
∣∣∣∣∣∣x[j]− x[i]∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
δ ← ∇xJ(fθ(x), y)
R(v) =
∣∣∣{i : ||δ[i]||2 ≤ v ∧ i ∈ {1 . . . N}}∣∣∣ . Statistical rank of v.
s0 ←
{
x[i] : N − σ + 1 ≤ R(||δ[i]||2) ≤ N ∧ i ∈ {1 . . . N}
}
sf ← s0
Cs0 (sf ) = J
(
fθ
(⋃N
i=1
{
x[i] + tanh
(∑σ
j=1(sf [j]− x[i])φµ′ (||s0[j]− x[i]||2)
)})
, y
)
Ps0 (sf ) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣⋃Ni=1 { tanh (∑σj=1(sf [j]− x[i])φµ′ (||s0[j]− x[i]||2))}∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
Find sf that maximizes Cs0 (sf )− λPs0 (sf ), with n iterations of Adam (learning rate = η)
x∗ ← ⋃Ni=1 {x[i] + tanh (∑σj=1(sf [j]− x[i])φµ′ (||s0[j]− x[i]||2))}
Attacks
None Iter. gradient L2 Distributional Perturb. resample Adv. sticks Adv. sinks
D
ef
en
se
s None 0.0% 97.9% 83.7% 95.5% 87.6% 89.4%
Remove outliers 5.1% 55.6% 43.7% 82.8% 87.8% 82.6%
Remove salient 6.7% 55.1% 38.5% 84.9% 89.4% 88.0%
H(x∗, S) 0 0.352 0.053 0.326 0.353 0.377
Gradient = 0 36.7% 44.4% 39.1% 39.1% 35.5% 43.1%
Resampled gradient = 0 - - - 32.4% 54.5% -
Table 1: The success rates of untargeted adversarial attacks against different defenses on the PointNet
architecture. The attack with the highest success rate against each defense is bolded. The average Hausdorff
distance H(x∗, S) between adversarial examples generated through each attack and the true object shapes
are shown in the third to last row. The average percentage of points that have gradients across all dimensions
equal to zero for each attack are shown in the second to last row. The average percentage of resampled
points that have gradients across all dimensions equal to zero are shown in the last row for the perturbation
resampling and adversarial sticks attacks.
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7 Results
7.1 Setup
Models. We train PointNet [Qi et al., 2017b] and
PointNet++ [Qi et al., 2017c] with default hyperpa-
rameters, but we use a slightly lowered batch size for
PointNet++.
Dataset. The neural networks are trained on the
training split of the ModelNet40 dataset [Wu et al.,
2015]. The test split of the dataset is used for evalu-
ating our adversarial attacks. We use point clouds of
size N = 1, 024 sampled with uniform density from
3D triangular meshes in the ModelNet40 dataset, and
assume that the 3D triangular meshes represent the
true shapes (S).
Attacks. For the traditional iterative gradient L2
attack, we use  = 3 and n = 10 iterations. For
the distributional attack, we use  = 1, τ = 0.05,
and n = 10 iterations. For perturbation resampling,
we use  = 3, we resample κ = 500 points, and we
run the attack for n = 10 iterations. For adversarial
sticks, we use  = 3, we add σ = 10 sticks, and we
resample κ = 200 points. For adversarial sinks, we
use a learning rate of η = 0.1 for the Adam optimizer
(β1 = 0.9 and β2 = 0.999), we scale the strength of
each sink point by µ = 5, we balance the objectives
using λ = 30, and we run the attack for n = 100
iterations with σ = 100 sink points. Unlike previous
work [Carlini and Wagner, 2017], we do not perform
binary search on λ for a fair comparison against the
other attacks.
Defenses. For removing outliers, we calculate the
average distance from each point to its 10 nearest
neighbors, and remove points with an calculated av-
erage distance greater than one standard deviation
from the average of the average distances across all
points. For removing salient points, we remove the
200 points with the highest saliencies. We do not test
adversarial training because it is not attack agnostic
and it was found to perform worse than the point
removal defenses [Liu et al., 2019].
7.2 Adversarial Attacks
In Table 1, we show the success rates of our attacks on
the 2,193 correctly classified objects from the Model-
Net40 dataset, against the PointNet architecture with
different defenses. Adversarial examples are visualized
in Figure 5 and Figure 3.
We also show the success rates of our attacks on
2,220 objects that are correctly classified by Point-
Net++, in Table 2.
We show the success rate of the adversarial attacks
as we increase the the number of points that are re-
moved in the outlier removal and salient point removal
defenses in Figure 6.
Success rates. The adversarial attacks we evalu-
ated on PointNet were all highly successful without
any defenses. The iterative gradient L2 attack at-
tained the highest success rate of 97.9%, while the
distributional attack resulted in the lowest success
rate of 83.7%. This was expected, since the distribu-
tional attack significantly limits the perceptibility of
the perturbation. On PointNet++, the adversarial
sticks attack did not perform well as it only reached a
success rate of 41.3%. This is probably due to Point-
Net++ ignoring the few, large adversarial sticks as it
locally groups points. Other attacks, like adversarial
sinks, perturbation resampling, and the distributional
attack result in higher success rates on PointNet++
than PointNet. The success rate of the distributional
attack is over 10% higher on PointNet++, which sug-
gests that PointNet++ is weaker against local spatial
attacks. On both PointNet and PointNet++, resam-
pling attacks (perturbation resampling and adversarial
sticks) obtained lower success rates than the itera-
tive gradient L2 attack that did not have resampling,
which means that resampling a fraction of the points
does inhibit gradient descent and decrease the overall
loss that we want to maximize in attacks. However,
they were still able to obtain relatively high success
rates on PointNet with just 10 iterations of gradient
descent. The difference in the success rates between
adversarial sticks and perturbation resampling attacks
on PointNet is due to only 10 sticks being generated,
while 524 points are perturbed with gradient descent
in perturbation resampling.
If we apply a defensive technique after each attack,
then the success rates of the iterative gradient L2 and
the distributional attack are reduced by approximately
two to three times on both networks. The three shape
attacks are much more resilient against point removal
defenses, and they maintain success rates of between
80% and 90% on PointNet. On PointNet++, per-
turbation resampling and adversarial sinks maintain
success rates slightly higher against the defenses com-
pared to the same attacks on PointNet. Adversarial
sticks obtains the highest success rate across all of the
attacks we test against a defended PointNet, while
adversarial sinks performs the best against a defended
PointNet++. Interestingly, after applying a defense
to the adversarial sticks attack, the success rate of the
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Attacks
None Iter. gradient L2 Distributional Perturb. resample Adv. sticks Adv. sinks
D
ef
en
se
s None 0.0% 100.0% 95.9% 98.8% 41.3% 94.1%
Remove outliers 11.4% 47.6% 30.1% 84.4% 48.2% 94.3%
Remove salient 11.0% 61.9% 28.2% 85.4% 50.2% 93.8%
H(x∗, S) 0 0.159 0.050 0.173 0.162 0.272
Table 2: The success rates of untargeted adversarial attacks against different defenses on the PointNet++
architecture. The average Hausdorff distance H(x∗, S) between adversarial examples generated through each
attack and the true object shapes are shown in the last row. The attack with the highest success rate against
each defense is bolded.
Figure 5: Visualizations of adversarial perturbations on an airplane, that are generated on the PointNet
architecture, against different defensive techniques.
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Figure 6: The success rates of adversarial attacks against the PointNet architecture as we increase the number
of points removed with the outlier removal (left) and the salient point removal (right) defenses. For the outlier
removal defense, more points are removed as the number of standard deviations from the average decreases.
attack increases. This is because we densely sample
many points on the adversarial sticks, so they are
not identified as outliers, and removing a few points
based on saliency does not significantly change the
sticks. Overall, most shape attacks represent a 50%
to 100% increase to the success rate of iterative gra-
dient L2 against point removal defenses. This was
expected because our shape attacks were designed to
ensure that there were resampled points near points
perturbed through gradient descent, so removing a
few points does not restore the shape of an adversarial
point cloud.
Stronger defenses. As we increase the number
of points removed through the outlier removal and
salient point removal defenses, we see that our three
shape attacks do not experience dramatic reductions
in their success rates. The shape attacks are approxi-
mately twice as successful against the defenses than
the iterative gradient L2 attack even when we remove
nearly half of the points in the adversarial point clouds.
Therefore, we can conclude that our shape attacks
are robust against strong point removal defenses. We
note that in practice, removing such a large amount of
points is not recommended, as we see that removing
nearly half of the points in each benign point cloud
also causes PointNet to misclassify around 20% of the
benign point clouds.
Perceptibility. We find that the average Hausdorff
distance of the iterative gradient L2 examples and
the shape attack examples we generate on PointNet
is between 0.3 and 0.4. On PointNet++, the iterative
gradient L2, perturbation resampling and adversarial
sticks attacks produce smaller perturbations between
0.1 and 0.2. For reference, each point cloud object is
bounded by a unit sphere. This means that the loss
wrt input gradients are smaller and the perturbations
are spread out over many different points for Point-
Net++, compared to PointNet. Interestingly, the
relatively low perceptibility of these attacks measured
through the Hausdorff distance shows that within a
certain amount of perturbation, we have a lot of free-
dom on how we want the perturbations on the shape
of a point cloud to look.
The distributional attack, which attempts to bound
the Hausdorff distance between approximations of the
true shapes of objects and adversarial examples to τ =
0.05, results in an average Hausdorff distance of 0.053
on PointNet. The slight difference is due to error when
approximating the true shapes. The distributional
attack also offers the best perturbation amount to
adversarial attack success rate tradeoff, since it reaches
83.7% success rate on PointNet and 95.9% success rate
on PointNet++ with a much lower average Hausdorff
distance than other attacks. This is compared to the
previously proposed gradient projection attack that
results in the success rates of 26.0% on PointNet and
24.5% on PointNet++, with a Hausdorff distance of
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0 [Liu et al., 2019].
Zero gradients. We find that over 30-40% of
points have zero gradients (loss wrt input points)
with PointNet. For a point cloud x, the number
of points with zero gradients is defined as |{i :
||(∇xJ(fθ(x), y))[i]||2 <  ∧ i ∈ {1 . . . N}}|, for a very
small  value. If a point has zero gradients, then it
is very likely that the point is not selected by the
max pooling operation in PointNet. We see that only
around 30% of the total 500 resampled points in the
last iteration of the perturbation resampling attack
have zero gradients, and around 50% of the total 200
resampled points in adversarial sticks have zero gra-
dients. Since the overall (not just resampled points)
average number of points that have zero gradients
do not significantly change for those two resampling
attacks compared to not performing any attacks, we
can conclude that the resampled points are selected by
the max pooling operation instead of other points. We
can also conclude that our initial assumptions about
the linearity of the neural networks is not too realis-
tic in practice. Therefore, the reason the resampling
attacks are effective is due to the resampled points
being near points perturbed through gradient descent.
8 Conclusion
We propose four new algorithms for attacking 3D point
cloud classifiers. Our experiments show that they are
able to generate effective adversarial perturbations
on 3D objects, even against point removal defenses
that attempt to restore the adversarial examples. Our
work presents new perspectives and approaches for
generating adversarial attacks in 3D space. These
attacks are important in better understanding the
behavior of neural networks in an adversarial setting,
and it gives us tools for evaluating neural networks
and defensive techniques in the 3D domain.
For future work, it is important to examine defenses
that do not make use of point cloud specific properties
like density, as we have shown that these defenses are
still vulnerable to attacks.
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